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Abstract  
The application of market mechanisms for the allocation of computing services is a demanding task, 
which requires bridging economic and associated technical challenges. Even if the market-based 
approach promises an efficient allocation of computing services, the wide heterogeneity of consumer 
requirements and the diversity of computational services on provider side are challenging the 
processes of finding, allocating, and using an appropriate service in an autonomous way. The focus of 
the most papers is mainly devoted to the optimization embedded in the allocation process itself. 
However, we think that the optimization process starts much earlier and contains the information 
gathering until the final market-based resource allocations. 
In this paper we introduce an integrated framework for market-based allocation of computing 
services, integrating information retrieval of market information, prediction models, bidding 
strategies and marked mechanisms. As proof-of-concept, we implemented a first prototype of the 
framework. Furthermore, we propose a methodology for evaluating strategic behavior in market 
mechanisms with bidding strategies using market information and statistical prediction techniques. 
First simulation results show strategic behavior in selected market mechanisms by applying the 
proposed techniques. 
Keywords: Market Mechanisms, Market Information, Bidding Strategies, Evaluation. 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION  
Grid and Cloud Computing become not only in science increasingly popular, but also in industry. 
Prominent examples are Sun Microsystem's Network.com, Amazons Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) 
and its Simple Storage Service (S3) and SimpleDB Service. The companies frequently offer a fixed 
pay-per-use price for static resource configurations. Fixed prices can lead to inefficient utilization, 
reward and usability, as it does not reflect the dynamics of the market supply and demand. Efficient 
provisioning and usage of computational resources as well as pricing in vigorous environment like 
Grid Computing is not manually manageable. Such processes should be automated with no or minimal 
human interaction. Hence, market mechanism and strategic behavior play an important role for the 
design of the environment. Self-organization and automatic adaptation to the changing market 
conditions are key prepositions for efficient offering and consuming of computational resources. 
An efficient allocation of consumers' jobs to providers' resources is a complex task, where agent 
decisions on resource provisioning, market-based allocation and information processing is included. 
Moreover, the wide heterogeneity of computational resources challenges the process of finding an 
appropriate resources for given consumer preferences. Since demand and supply of computational 
resources fluctuates in the course of time, information about current and future resource utilizations 
and prices are often not known a priori to the participants. In this case consumer and provider agents 
try to maximize their utilities by generating bids based on available information. This enables strategic 
behavior both on provider as well as on consumer side. 
The knowledge about a market is essential for the design of efficient bidding strategies. Examples are 
computational approaches incorporating game theory that allow predicting the future through 
forecasting or learning rules on former or actual trading information. Bergemann's survey (Bergemann 
and Valimaki 2007) shows that the economic aspect of information acquisition in market mechanisms 
got more attention by the economic research community. Moreover, the study demonstrates the 
importance of the economic information disclosure for market participants. The need for this 
information lies in both being able to apply efficient economic strategies and to feed business models, 
which are behind these strategies. 
The first contribution of this paper is to survey and bring together results for market-based allocation 
of computational resources. More specifically, to structure the allocation processes in individual steps, 
we go further in regard to specify mechanisms for information provision and retrieval, price 
prediction, bid generation and market-based resource allocations. Based on them, we propose an 
integrated system for market-based computational resource allocation, which organizes the discussed 
processes. Finally, we specify a common evaluation scenario and present first results. 
Following the structure of the paper, section 2 presents promising market mechanisms and bidding 
strategies. Section 3 shows the role of market information and prediction models for improving 
allocation efficiency. Thus, section 4 shows an integrated model of a market-based allocation system. 
Evaluation methodology and first results are depicted in section 5 and related work in section 6. 
2 MARKET-BASED RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
Auction and strategy selection are closely connected in the sense that a given choice of strategy should 
affect the choice of auction, and vice versa. For example, some bidding strategies perform well in a 
Continuous Double Auction, but not in other auctions such as the Dutch auction. This also implies that 
the choice which auction to participate in depends on the available strategies. Other factors to take into 
account are the bidding rules – when, how and what to bid, current and average prices, transaction 
costs, and pricing schemata in the different auctions.  
In this section, we discuss potential market mechanisms for allocation of computing services as well as 
potential bidding strategies enabling the automation of the provisioning and usage processes. 
2.1 Market Mechanisms for Computing Services 
Economic models for resource scheduling are widely explored in the literature (Wolski et al. 2001, 
Parkes et al. 2004, Lai et al. 2005, Nassif et al. 2007). According to the allocation modes, scheduling 
mechanisms can be distinguished into mechanisms, which execute periodically, called also “offline 
mechanisms”, and mechanisms which execute continuously, called also “online mechanisms”. 
Mechanisms like Vickrey, English, Dutch, double auctions (Grosu and Das 2006)  and combinatorial 
mechanisms (Bapna et al. 2005) involve a scheduling problem that is complex. The complexity of 
such mechanisms drives research to look at allocation models, which can be adapted to real-world 
scenarios and requirements.  
Following section presents promising market mechanisms, implemented within the integrated model 
(section 4) to evaluate market-based allocation of computing resources as well as strategic behavior 
using the market information from the proposed market information service.  
2.1.1 Continuous Double Auction 
The CDA has been widely employed in experimental economic studies, where different agent 
strategies (Gjerstad and Dickhaut 1998, He et al. 2003, Vytelingum et al. 2008) are investigated for 
applying automated bidding behavior by the provisioning and usage of resources. The matching in 
CDA is mostly based on a single value – price, which in a computing resource scenario incorporates 
the consumer’s preferences for a job i.e. his value 𝑣𝑗  per time unit. Based on a preferred bidding 
strategy (see section 2.2) a consumer generates and submits a bid price (𝑏𝑗 ≤ 𝑣𝑗 ) to the CDA market. 
Respectively, based on a preferred bidding strategy, a resource provider also generates an offer price 
(𝑜𝑖 ≥ 𝑣𝑗 ) and submits it to the market. In the provider case 𝑣𝑗  represents the reserve price (minimum 
price) for using the provider’s machine for a unit of time. In case of a match, the consumer executes 
immediately his job on the provider’s machine with a payment to the provider, calculated by the 
winning bid and offer prices. The market price of a match is calculated using the pricing schema k-
pricing (Satterthwaite and Williams 1989):  𝑝𝑚 = 𝑘𝑏𝑗 +  ( 1 −  𝑘) 𝑜𝑖 , with 𝑘 =  0.5 in our case.  
2.1.2 Decentralized Online Machine Scheduling  
In the case of the Decentralized Local Greedy Mechanism DLGM (Heydenreich et al. 2006), each 
time a job 𝑗 arrives on the consumer side, his bidding agent creates a request in the form 𝑡𝑗 =
{𝑟𝑗 ,𝑑𝑗 , 𝑣𝑗 } with its release date 𝑟𝑗 , duration 𝑑𝑗  and valuation 𝑣𝑗 , and reports this to all known providers. 
The valuation 𝑣𝑗  expresses the costs of the job for waiting one additional time unit in the provider 
machine’s queue. Based on the received bids, the machines perform real-time planning based on a 
local scheduling policy – if job j has a higher priority value than 𝑘 ⇔
𝑣𝑗
𝑑𝑗
≥
𝑣𝑘
𝑑𝑘
, then j is scheduled 
before job k in the waiting queue. Depending on the current local waiting queue, the machine i reports 
a tentative (ex-ante reported) completion time 𝐶  and payment 𝜋  to the agent of job 𝑗 . The payment 𝜋  
contains the aggregated compensations to all job-agents whose jobs are currently waiting at machine 
𝑖 and are delayed due to allocation of 𝑗. 
Upon receiving information about its tentative completion time and required payments, the job-agent 
makes a binding decision to queue at certain machine 𝑖, and pays 𝜋  to the delayed jobs. The decision 
on which machine to submit the job is taken based on the consumer’s utility function 𝑢 𝑗 =
− 𝑣𝑗 ∗ 𝐶 𝑗 ,𝑖 + 𝜋 𝑗 ,𝑖𝑖  , which selects a provider machine’s offer 𝑖 with the shortest weighted tentative 
completion time 𝑣𝑗 ∗ 𝐶 𝑗 ,𝑖  and tentative compensation payments 𝜋 𝑗 ,𝑖 . The providers applying the DLGM 
mechanism do not behave strategically and do not get compensation for the use of their services. The 
payments are divided only among the consumers. Heydenreich et al. showed that the plain DLGM 
mechanism achieves a performance ratio of 3.281 against an optimal offline scheduling mechanism. 
2.1.3 Fix-Price Technical Scheduling 
In order to compare the outcomes of the introduced market mechanisms, we implemented FIFO as 
baseline scheduling mechanism. The agents submit their jobs to a central scheduler, which schedules 
and executes them through the FIFO scheduling policy on the various registered provider machines. 
For each machine the providers request a fixed reservation price.  
2.2 Defining Bidding Strategies 
Bidding strategies for market-based scheduling are well explored in the economic literature (Reeves et 
al. 2005, Li and Yahyapour 2006a, Vytelingum et al. 2008). Wellman et al. 2007 give an overview of 
the various agents and their strategies taken place in the trading agent competition.  In general, bidding 
strategies can be classified into non-adaptive, where the generated bid price do not depend on past and 
market information e.g. Truth-Telling, and ZI as well as adaptive strategies, where the generated bid 
price depends on past and market information e.g. ZIP and GD.  
Although a simple strategy, truth-telling is essential in case of strategy-proof mechanisms, where in 
such mechanisms this strategy guarantees to obtain optimal payoffs, no matter what strategies are 
adopted by the others. A comparison of state-of-the-art bidding strategies is evaluated by Das et al. 
2001. The authors of Adaptive-Aggressiveness (AA) strategy (Vytelingum et al. 2008) describe and 
evaluate a novel bidding strategy, which implements short and long-term learning, considering and 
responding also to dynamic market fluctuations. Simulation results show that the AA outperforms the 
ZIP and GDX (Tesauro and Bredin 2002) strategies. 
Although mainly designed for financial markets, these strategies are fundamental for the design and 
evaluation of bidding strategies and market mechanisms for Grid and Cloud services (Foster et al. 
2008). Following sections present bidding strategies, which we aim to adopt in a Grid market scenario. 
2.2.1 Zero- Intelligence Plus  Strategy 
Zero-Intelligence Plus (ZIP) agents are widely explored and become a popular benchmark for agents 
trading on continuous double auctions (Das et al. 2001). In Cliff 1997, the author showed that zero 
intelligence (ZI) agent strategy is not enough, since the bids are uniform generated between a given 
interval and not depend on current market information or past bids. They introduced ZIP agents, which 
use public market information to adapt the bid price of a certain market.  Experiments (Das et al. 
2001) show that ZIP agents perform better than (non-expert) human traders on CDA markets as well 
as it converges quickly to equilibrium price by high demand and supply.  
In most experiments in the literature (Cliff 1997, Tesauro and Das 2001, Das et al. 2001), the ZIP 
agents receive information of all bids and offers, whether they are accepted or not. There are, however, 
experiments showing that ZIP based agents perform well also in auctions where the agents only 
receive information on the winning bids (Bagnall and Toft 2005). In our scenario we will adopt the 
ZIP strategy in the same way, considering only the winning bids and clearing price of the market. 
2.2.2 Gjerstad-Dickhaut Strategy 
The Gjerstad-Dickahaut, GD (Gjerstad and Dickhaut 1998, Tesauro and Bredin 2002) bidding strategy 
is also mainly developed and evaluated in CDA markets. Compared to ZIP, this mechanism is memory 
based, thus it is using historic market information of the last 𝑀 bids and offers, 𝐻𝑀 , in order to 
calculate a “belief” function 𝑓(𝑝) estimating the probability for a bid or offer to be accepted at price 𝑝.   
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Consumer belief function 𝑓𝑏(𝑝)  =  
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 is the number of 
unaccepted offers in 𝐻𝑀, 𝑜 ∉ 𝐴𝐻𝑀 , with offer price 𝑜 ≤ 𝑝, respectively in opposite for the consumer. 
Interpolation is applied for prices at which no bids and offers are registered in 𝐻𝑀. The bid or offer 
price is calculated by the product 𝑓 𝑝 ∗ 𝑔, where 𝑔 is the calculated gain for a trade at that price, 
𝑔 = 𝑝 − 𝑣 for providers and 𝑔 = 𝑣 − 𝑝 for consumers, where 𝑣 is the valuation. 
Although mainly evaluated in CDA markets, GD is applicable as a state-of-the-art strategy in markets 
for computing resources to the estimation of bids, considering past bids and market information. 
2.2.3 Q-Strategy  
Q-Strategy (Borissov and Wirström 2008), is a novel bidding strategy adopting a reinforcement 
learning approach with an e-greedy selection policy. Using the Q-Strategy, an agent explores the 
environment, exploitation phase, with a probability of ε, learning available provider machines and the 
reward of executing a job on them. With a probability of 1-ε, exploitation phase the strategy exploits 
the collected knowledge (i.e. market information) for generating bids more intelligently. 
Using Q-Strategy, the agents can bid and adapt also in markets, where market information is 
incomplete. Simulations show that Q-Strategy adapts to market dynamics (fluctuating prices and 
changing utilities from providers machines) in different market mechanisms and against bidding 
strategies like ZIP and Truth-Telling. A common drawback of reinforcement learning algorithms is 
that learning the optimal bid price needs “training time”. In worst case, Q-Strategy will perform worse 
at the beginning, but will converge to optimal values in the time (Watkins and Dayan 1992). 
3 THE ROLE OF MARKET INFORMATION  
Bidding strategies (section 2.2) and prediction techniques (sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.3) require market 
information in order to efficiently bid in selected markets. However, in a distributed environment like 
in open and wide Grid markets like in SORMA (http://www.sorma-project.eu/) such information is not 
locally accessible. (Bergemann and Valimaki 2007) demonstrate the importance of economic 
information disclosure and show the increased attention, paid to economic information acquisition. 
Traders require information that enables them to deduce entry prices for available markets and trading 
times. Centralized markets are able to furnish the current information necessary for simple or 
sophisticated bidding strategies - such as ZIP agents (Preist and van Tol 1998) or human traders. 
Therefore, this is an issue for distributed and segmented markets. Distribution and segmentation of 
markets result in loss of information such as prices, products and effective supply (Brunner et al. 
2008). An efficient information system should allow participants to choose a compromise between 
exact global information and partial information. Furthermore, aggregated, anonymous and 
summarized information contribute to scalability and may in most cases be sufficient. We conclude 
the following hypothesis for the influence of information to distributed markets. 
Bidding strategies need information about a state of the market, commonly through the offered 
resource type and price dynamics in time. The main focus here is the treatment of market information 
by agent’s bidding strategies applying statistical price prediction techniques. 
Statistics are used in markets to measure current conditions as well as to forecast financial or 
economic trends. Indicators are used extensively in technical analysis to predict changes in stock 
trends or price patterns. Economic indicators quantifying current economic and industry conditions are 
used to provide insight into the future demand for commodity goods. In our approach, we use 
statistical prediction methods for price forecasting. 
3.1.1 Trend Extrapolation  
The trend extrapolation indicates new trends within the market. In computation markets this is 
important when newer or higher performance resources entered the market, which will start a 
deceasing trend for older resources. We will use different kind of moving averages that are indicators 
in technical analysis of market charts and show the average value of a security's price over a set 
period.  Moving averages are used to emphasize the direction of a trend and to smooth out price and 
volume fluctuations, or noise. Most bidding strategies implement learning mechanisms, which use 
statistical prediction models. The ZIP bidding strategy, for example, uses a Widrow-Hoff gradient 
algorithm, a learning rule (Preist and van Tol 1998), which is a variation of the moving average rule.  
In time series analysis, the Moving Average model is common approach to model univariate time 
series models. A Simple Moving Average (SMA) is the unweighted mean of the previous n data points. 
For example, a 10-day simple moving average of closing price is the mean of the previous 10 days' 
closing prices. If those prices are 𝑃𝑀 ,𝑃𝑀−1 ,… ,𝑃𝑀−9 then the formula is 𝑆𝑀𝐴 =
𝑃𝑀+ 𝑃𝑀−1+ …+ 𝑃𝑀−9
10
 
In all cases a moving average lags behind the latest data point, simply from the nature of its 
smoothing. An SMA can lag to an undesirable extent, and can be disproportionately influenced by old 
data points dropping out of the average. This is addressed by giving extra weight to more recent data 
points, as in the weighted and exponential moving averages.  
A SMA calculates the average of a whole period to predict the future price, which has poor ability to 
react to new market events. Therefore we will evaluate our approach with a Weighted Moving Average 
(WMA) to give more weight to recent prices: 𝑥 =
1
𝑛
 𝑥𝑖 =  
1
𝑛
 𝑥1 +  
1
𝑛
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1
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1
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  are the weights, which sum to 1.   
An Exponential Moving Average (EMA) is based on the WMA and applies weighting factors which 
decrease exponentially. The weighting for each older data point decreases exponentially, giving much 
more importance to recent observations while still considering older observations 
𝐸𝑀𝐴 =
𝑝1 +  1 − 𝛼 𝑝2 +  1 − 𝛼 
2𝑝3 +  1 − 𝛼 
3𝑝4 + ⋯
1 +  1 − 𝛼 +  1 − 𝛼 2 +  1 − 𝛼 3 + ⋯
 
3.1.2  Cyclic and seasonal component models 
Cyclic and seasonal prediction models are applied to detect deviation and trends according to the 
properties of computational market, which follows periodic type of behaviour. This can be the 
property of different prices due to the demand on daytime or weekdays. We evaluated workloads 
(Feitelson 2008) resolving that e.g. in a university network the demand for computational resources is 
significantly higher during official working hours than during night times or weekends. In our 
analysis, we will use the autoregressive moving average model (ARMA) and the seasonal 
autoregressive moving average model (ARIMA).  
Autoregressive Moving Average Model 𝐴𝑅𝑀𝐴 (𝑝) refers to the autoregressive model of order p. The 
𝐴𝑅𝑀𝐴(𝑝) model is defined as  𝑋𝑡 = 𝑐 +  𝜑𝑖𝑋𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜖𝑡
𝑝
𝑖=1 , where 𝜑1 ,… ,𝜑𝑝  are the parameters of the 
model, 𝑐 is a constant and 𝜖𝑡  is white noise. An autoregressive model is essentially an all-pole infinite 
impulse response filter with some additional interpretation placed on it. Some constraints are 
necessary on the values of the parameters of this model in order that the model remains stationary. For 
example, processes in the 𝐴𝑅(1) model with |𝜑1| ≥ 1 are not stationary. 
3.1.3 Grid specific models 
As we investigate computational market we will also apply models, which are successful in predicting 
the demand of computational resources. Sandholm and Lai (Sandholm and Lai 2008) showed that a 
prediction based on Chebyshev is better suited for predicting performance guarantees, which need 
worst case scenarios than perfect forecasting. 
4 AN INTEGRATED MODEL – INFORMATION AND MARKETS 
We propose an integrated architecture for market-based allocation for computational resources. The 
components have clear separated capabilities and interactions to achieve an economically efficient 
allocation of applications to needed computing resources. The model is composed by different 
independent systems (Borissov and Wirström 2008, Brunner et al 2008), which allow a clear 
separation of code, functionality and expert domain for an easier development, maintenance and fault-
detection. The BidGenerator, the Market Information System, the Trading Manager and the Resource 
Manager are the main components, building an infrastructure for market-based allocation of 
computing services. 
Real applications of the proposed model are listed and described in detail in (Nimis et al. 2008).  The 
application component expresses batch jobs or real (web or desktop) applications, which has to be 
executed on demanded computing resources. Therefore, the consumer of the application submits a 
resource request to the BidGenerator. On the other side, the resource manager manages the resources 
of the provider and is responsible for the execution of the allocated applications. In order to offer a 
free resource, the resource manager submits a request to the BidGenerator for the resource provision. 
 
Figure 1. Integrated architecture of the related components. 
 
The BidGenerator (Borissov and Wirström 2008) implements common and new bidding strategies 
(section ), that autonomously generate and place the consumer bids and provider offers. The bids and 
offers are generated based on the consumer's preferences and the provider's business model, both 
initiated in the requests to the BidGenerator. A consumer specifies its preferences in form of a 
description of the required computing resources, duration of the job/application usage, valuation 
(maximum price) and preferred bidding strategy. A provider specifies its supply request in form of a 
resource description, duration of the provision, valuation (reserve price) and preferred bidding 
strategy. Than the BidGenerator instantiates the selected bidding strategy and starts the bidding 
process. 
The bids are submitted to the Trading Management (TM) component, which implements and runs 
market mechanisms (section 2.1) for technical and economic matching. The TM is a platform, which 
defines the interfaces and rules for implementing market mechanisms and the conversation protocol. 
In our case, the bids and offers (e.g. simplified example will be a CDA for CPUs with 2GHz), which 
are generated by the BidGenerator, are submitted to the TM via well defined interfaces of the selected 
market mechanism. When there is a match, the BidGenerator receives and informs the consumer or 
provider to execute its application on the allocated resource. 
The Market Information Service (MIS) (Brunner et al. 2008) obtains economic data from the Trading 
Manager and provides it to the BidGenerator. The architecture has been designed to meet both the 
economic information requirements and that of scalability and robustness of distributed environment. 
Aggregation mechanisms are used to reach scalability in number of data and agent requests. Many of 
the introduced bidding strategies (Section 2.2) like ZIP, GD are exploiting prediction techniques (see 
Section 3), which require public market information.  The MIS retrieves and aggregates public market 
information from the TM to provide them to the BidGenerator. 
A short sample of products are commodity goods which are analysed commonly in markets, however, 
we seek to extend the model to more realistic goods for computing resources. We introduce a resource 
tuple with core description entities as baseline for representing and aggregating market information for 
computing resources.  
Definition 1: We define a resource tuple 𝑅 = {𝐶𝑃𝑈,𝑀, 𝑆,𝑇𝑠 ,𝑇𝑒 ,𝐷}, where 𝐶𝑃𝑈 is the processing 
power, 𝑀 is the memory, 𝑆 is the storage, 𝑇𝑠 is the earliest start time, 𝑇𝑒  is the latest end time and 𝐷 is 
the duration of the job or resource reservation.  
A demanded resource request can technically be allocated if each of the individual requirement is met 
e.g., minimum 𝐶𝑃𝑈 of 2GHz, memory capacity of 1GB, storage of 10GB, etc. The same principle is 
used for the market information system, a bidding agent can search for the minimum, maximum or 
average price of 𝑅, where the individual requirements are met. This information will be used by the 
prediction mechanisms described in Section 3.1. 
5 EVALUATION METHODOLOGY 
To evaluate the integrated architecture in section 4, market mechanisms, bidding strategies and 
prediction techniques, we propose a common agent-based evaluation scenario and present first results.  
5.1 Agent-Based Simulation  
Table 1 summarizes the bidding strategies and mechanisms to be evaluated in varying job workload 
settings. The trading object is a computing resource as a commodity good or resource bundle. Within 
the simulation we aim to measure the consumer 𝑈𝑐  and provider 𝑈𝑝  utilityutilities and overall welfare 
adopting various bidding strategies (see 2.2 and 3) in three market mechanisms (see 2.1). Furthermore 
we aim to measure the quality 𝑄 of the forecast, deviation of real 𝑅 𝑡  to forecast value 𝐹(𝑡 − 1),  
applying the prediction techniques (section 3) in novel bidding strategies, Prediction Traders.  
In order to compare the strategies and market mechanism, we define 6 settings, Table 2, whereas each 
setting comprised from 20 until 200 providers and consumers. Settings 1 to 3 are generated with a 
Poisson arrival process, suggested by (Feitelson 2008), by increasing the mean 𝜆, generating 1000, 
3000 and 5000 jobs. Settings 4 to 5 are real workloads, taken from (Feitelson 2008).  
 
 
 Configuration 
Agents  
Market 
Mechanism 
Trading Object Job Data Metrics 
Zero-Intelligence Plus  CDA,  
DLGM, 
FIFO 
Commodity good,  
Resource bundle - 
 {𝐶𝑃𝑈,𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑦, 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒} 
 
Generated and  
real workloads 
Consumers utility 
𝑈𝑐 =   𝑢𝑐(𝑗)𝑗𝑐 , 
Providers utility 
𝑈𝑝 =   𝑢𝑝(𝑖)𝑖𝑝 , 
Overall welfare 
𝑈𝑤 = 𝑈𝑐 + 𝑈𝑝 , 
Forecast quality 
𝑄 = 𝑅(𝑡) − 𝐹(𝑡 − 1) 
Truth-Telling  
Gjerstad-Dickhaut  
QStrategy  
Prediction Traders 
(section 3) 
Table 1. Overall simulation scenario. 
The workloads LPC EGEE (Medernach 2005), LLNL Atlas and LLNL Thunder are real cluster usage 
workloads, each containing 234,889, 42,725 and 121,039 jobs, occupying settings 4, 5 and 6. The LPC 
log was chosen as a basis because it contains a large variety of jobs with different run-times, numbers 
of used CPUs, and varying submit and start times. Finally, the valuation of a job and the reserve price 
of a resource are taken from a normal distribution. 
 
Provider machines 10, 20, 100 
Consumers 10, 20, 100 
Job-Valuation Normal distribution 
Reserve price Normal distribution 
Generated workloads 
 
Job arrival  Poisson process P(𝜆) 
Job duration Normal distribution 
Setting 1 to 3 1000 to 5000 jobs 
Real workloads Setting 4 to 6 LPC EGEE, LLNL Atlas, LLNL Thunder 
Table 2. Simulation settings. 
5.2 Simulation Results 
First results are shown in Table 3. The table shows the evaluation of consumer strategic behavior 
using Truth-Telling and Q-Strategy (2.2.3) in a centralized CDA (2.1.1), decentralized DLGM (2.1.2) 
and in a FIFO (2.1.3) mechanisms. The providers are acting strategically only in CDA, in DLGM and 
FIFO they are offering their resources for free.  
 
Setting Strategy 𝑫𝑳𝑮𝑴𝝁  𝑫𝑳𝑮𝑴𝝇 𝑪𝑫𝑨𝝁  𝑪𝑫𝑨𝝇 𝑭𝑰𝑭𝑶𝝁  𝑭𝑰𝑭𝑶𝝇 
1  Truth-Telling -110 272 -7,92*10-4 95 -140 8 
1 Q-Strategy -175 258 -10,33*10-4 94 -135 8 
2 Truth-Telling -213 285 -11,95*10-4 94 -277 8 
2 Q-Strategy -392 266 -14,63*10-4 93 -265 8 
3 Truth-Telling -404 286 -7,89*10-4 87 -549 8 
3 Q-Strategy -901 265 -23,22*10-4 91 -525 8 
4 Truth-Telling -1104 647 -9,91*10-4 392 -4532 400 
4 Q-Strategy -1172 581 -11,04*10-4 314 -4444 400 
Table 3. Consumer strategic behavior in three mechanisms. 
Each line in the table represents the evaluation of a selected bidding strategy in a selected market for 
one setting. The workloads – setting 1-3 – are created with a Poisson distribution with means 𝜇 =
{0.1, 0.3, 0.5} generating 751, 1502 and 3004 jobs. Setting 4 is the real cluster workload – LPC-EGEE, 
taken from a Parallel Workload Archive (Feitelson 2008). The first two columns represent the setting 
(corresponding to those of Table 1) and the evaluated strategy. The next two columns represent the 
average utility per job 𝜇 =
− 𝑣𝑗∗𝐶 𝑗 ,𝑖+𝜋 𝑗 ,𝑖𝑖
𝑛
  as well as the standard deviation 𝜍 of job budget and actual 
payment in DLGM and the last four columns represent the same for CDA and FIFO.  
 The results show that Truth-Telling strategy achieves the highest average utility for all settings in both 
DLGM and CDA, which follows that bidding truthfully in DLGM (2.1.2) and CDA (2.1.1) can only 
increase the consumer utility. Understating the truthful valuation in lower bid results in a poorer “job 
priority” by DLGM and thus job can be displaced by other jobs which have higher priority. In case of 
CDA, the prices depend on the current demand and supply, bidding a lower price instead of the truth 
valuation increases the risk of no allocation by the mechanism. However, in CDA, the matching is 
based only on the price without considering the “priority” of a job as with DLGM, and thus achieves 
very low utility compared to DLGM. Furthermore, CDA-provider machine agents do not maintain a 
priority queue of the submitted job bids and by an allocation the job is immediately submitted and 
executed on the provider machine. A provider submits an offer as soon as he becomes idle. Thus each 
time the agents are competing by adapting their job bids based on the used strategy. In overall, the 
DLGM mechanism outperforms FIFO in all four settings using the Truth-Telling bidding strategy and 
achieves the highest common wealth for all participating consumer agents. 
 
Figure 2. ZIP agents trading in a CDA with market information. 
Figure 2 contains results from simulation of that market in which agents with a ZIP strategy are 
competing so sell resources as commodity goods. It depicts that the simulations run stable over a 
period of 50000 trading rounds with 2000 buyers and sellers. 
6 RELATED WORK 
The influence of information to market-based resource allocation mechanisms expands over different 
research areas. In Section 3, we explained related and potential market-based resource allocation 
methods and bidding strategies for these mechanisms. We summarize explicitly the information 
retrieval process and the individual prediction models in Section 4. This related work section describes 
work concerning the overall evaluation process of different prediction and learning mechanisms based 
on historical information. 
Sandholm and Lai (Sandholm 2008) apply different mechanisms to predict the future demand of 
computational resources. They conclude to deduct the price of the resources from different real 
workload traces; however, markets with real market are not analyzed.  The goal is to predict high 
peaks and though allow the consumers to avoid these to get lower prices or other benefits. This is 
especially important as sophisticated strategies change the markets behaviors. Moreover, different 
market mechanisms result in different peaks and distribution of the allocations. (Cardosa and Chandra 
2007) analyze statistical aggregation for resource allocation. This information retrieval aggregates 
historical data, which builds the basis for the prediction mechanisms. They provide further breakup of 
a commodity good like analyzed in most market-allocation mechanisms into resource bundles, 
however, economic mechanisms are not considered. A market-based scheduling mechanism for the 
allocation of time-specific resources is shown by (MacKie-Mason et al. 2004). It evaluates different 
prediction mechanisms to govern the time slot in competitive bidding process. They started with the 
combination of price prediction and bidding strategies to conclude that price prediction improves 
performance in a decentralized market-based scheduling environment. 
Another survey and evaluation of market-based prediction mechanism is (Wellman et al. 2002), which 
analysis the prediction mechanisms of all participants of a trader competition. The evaluation 
compares price prediction mechanisms such as historical averaging, machine learning, and a 
competitive economy analysis in regard to their relative prediction accuracy. Wellman et al. conclude 
that a combination of historical data with current information produce the best prediction in a 
competitive analysis. In our work we will analyze and compare processes as entities in competition. 
We can conclude from the presented related work that many mechanisms for the statistical prediction 
of prices exist for markets. Furthermore, different learning mechanisms and trading strategies are 
introduced, which are shown in previous sections. The related work, stated in this section, began with 
the comparison and analysis of these techniques. However, to our knowledge an overall approach 
combining the different areas of efficient information retrieval, statistical prediction, learning rules, 
trading strategies, and different market mechanisms is still an open issue. 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we proposed and analyzed alternative approaches to improve information flow within 
markets. Those approaches are measured with respect to the impact endogenous trading information 
has on the allocation quality. More precisely, we introduced promising market mechanisms, bidding 
strategies and prediction techniques, which have been evaluated and selected regarding their potential 
to optimize the resource allocation.  Afterwards, we explained how these methods can be technically 
combined, integrated and evaluated within the allocation and information gathering process. For an 
easier and complete evaluation process, we developed a prototype for the proposed framework and 
showed baseline experiments with the proof-of-concept implementation. Positive integration results 
were obtained within an implemented market system for computing resource allocation. 
As part of our analysis, we found that related work often proposes mechanisms in isolation for each 
topic, like the market mechanism, bidding strategy or information treatment, without regarding the 
complete interaction of components. Moreover, the focus of these mechanisms is not on the 
optimization of computational resource allocation. With the prototype, we show the integration of the 
approaches in a real framework, enabling autonomous provisioning and usage of computing resources. 
We identified evaluation scenarios and metrics for the impact of information in order to determine 
suitable combinations of market mechanisms, bidding strategies and related prediction techniques. 
The future focus is on the evaluation of the proposed market mechanisms, bidding strategies and 
related prediction techniques from consumer to provider side. Applying the evaluation model with the 
proposed metrics will enable to measure the impact of real systems and identify optimal configurations 
of market mechanisms and bidding strategies with related prediction techniques to enable efficient 
market-based allocation of computing resources.  
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